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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the District Court erred in granting Defendant's
motion for summary judgment by holding that a State agency's
negligent destruction of a person's property arises from a
judicial proceeding when the property came into its possession
pursuant to a search warrant executed several months before the
negligence occurred.
Summary judgment should be granted only when ''there is no
genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
When reviewing whether the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment, the appellate court reviews the legal conclusions of
the trial court for correctness. Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44,
18, 48 P.3d 949. A trial court's interpretation of a statute is
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Id. In reviewing a
grant of summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Utah
Dept. of Transportation, 2006 UT 15, 5 15, 133 P.3d 402.
Appellants originally raised this issue in their Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R. at 342-47),
preserving the issue for appeal.
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §63-30d-301 (1953 as amended by Laws 2004,
c.267, § 13—See addendum).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Ryan Hoyer is an amateur herpetologist. He
assists his father, Appellant Richard Hoyer, in research
centered on a species of snake commonly known as the rubber boa
{Charina

bottae).

Richard Hoyer, a retired secondary school

science teacher, has been researching and recording data on the
rubber boa for over 40 years and has devoted thousands of hours
and spent thousands of dollars in the process. He has coauthored
a number of publications with professional herpetologists. His
research centers on all life-history aspects of the rubber boa
(C.

bottae.)
In June 2002, "Operation Slither" was started as a joint

investigation between the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
and the United States Fish and Wildlife Services. Operation
Slither was intended to target individuals who were involved in
the illegal possession and commercial trade in reptiles. In
October of 2003, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service pulled out
of the Utah portion of this investigation, leaving the Utah
Division of Wildlife Resources to continue their investigation
alone.
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Even though Ryan Hoyer is not a commercial trafficker in
the illegal reptile trade, the Division of Wildlife Resources
(DWR) targeted his research for investigation. On January 9,
2004, a search warrant was executed at the home of Ryan Hoyer
(85 E. 2275 S. Clearfield, Utah) by DWR officers. Among the
items seized was a computer, various documents and approximately
65 common rubber boa snakes of the species C. bottaer

all of

which subsequently perished in the possession of DWR.
As of August 2004, twenty six (26) of the approximately
sixty-five (65) snakes had died in the possession of Defendants
as far as Appellants were aware. On October 16, 2006, pursuant
to an order from the Clearfield City Justice Court (Case No. 058178), Appellants had opportunity to inspect the seized snakes
that were held at DWR offices in Salt Lake City. On that
occasion, Appellants learned that of the snakes seized on
January 9, 2006 (approximately 65 total) all but eight (8) were
dead by that time.
While the snakes have been in possession of Utah DWR,
Richard Hoyer has made numerous communications and attempts to
travel to Utah in order to provide expert assistance and
training to Utah DWR for the care of the snakes. Richard Hoyer
has offered to provide care for the snakes or provide other
expert care by a third party. These offers were declined by Utah
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DWR and as a result, most if not all of the snakes eventually
died while in the care and possession of Utah DWR.
Appellants filed suit against the State of Utah and the
State employees involved in the seizure and subsequent care of
the property, alleging negligence among other claims. On
September 11, 2007, the State moved for summary judgment on the
negligence count, claiming that Appellants' injuries arose from
a judicial proceeding (the issuance of the warrant) and the
State was therefore immune from suit under Utah Code Ann. §6330d-301 (5) (e) (R. at 304-14). The State argued that but for the
warrant, the snakes would not have been in their possession and
therefore, no injury could have occurred (R. at 310-14).
Appellants timely submitted a memorandum in opposition to the
State's motion on September 18, 2007, arguing that Appellants'
injuries did not arise out of the issuance of the warrant but
rather their negligence, which occurred sometime after, and was
not in any way necessitated by, the issuance of the warrant (R.
at 342-47, 374-78).
Judge Anthony B. Quinn heard oral argument on the State's
motion on November 20, 2007, and granted summary judgment for
the State in an order dated December 13, 2007 (R. at 379,38084). Judge Quinn's order held that the State was immune from
suit and stated that "but for the actions taken by the State
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pursuant to a judicial proceeding, plaintiffs would not have
suffered injury." (R. at 382).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The purpose of the Government Immunity Act was to allow
private citizens to hold the State accountable for its
negligence. The district court's application of a

NN

but-for" test

in determining whether an injury arises out of an excepted
activity or condition under the Government Immunity Act is a
flawed interpretation of the Act. It is not only doctrinally
incoherent and counter to the stated purpose of the act, it
would also free the State from any duty to care for property
that it has seized for evidentiary purposes. This interpretation
would mean that private citizens must rely on the good graces of
the State to safeguard their property. That cannot be what the
Legislature intended in passing the Act.
A better test for whether a negligent act is excepted from
liability under the Government Immunity Act is a two-part test:
first, if the excepted activity or condition is a direct cause
of the injury, there is immunity from suit under the Act.
Second, if the excepted activity is not the direct cause of the
injury, then a court should determine whether the negligent act
or omission that a plaintiff claims proximately caused its
injuries was integrally related to the excepted activity or
condition. This test is similar to the tests for "arises out of"
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in other areas of the law and sets limits on liability so that
the exceptions do not swallow the rule.
The negligent acts of State employees in this case were not
integrally related to the issuance of the search warrant. This
Court should hold that the State does not retain immunity under
the Government Immunity Act.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY ACT REQUIRES MORE THAN
A SHOWING OF "BUT-FOR" CAUSATION FOR THE STATE TO
RETAIN IMMUNITY.
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to address the
matter of jurisdiction. Appellants refer the Court to their
memorandum in opposition on the matter and choose to rest on the
arguments as laid out therein. Appellants reserve the right to
make additional arguments in its reply brief if the State
includes any additional arguments in its brief.
In order to determine whether a governmental action is
shielded from liability, the Court must undertake a three-part
test to assess "(1) whether the activity is a governmental
function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the
particular activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to
that waiver." Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44 at 5 10. In this
case, both parties have conceded that steps 1 and 2 have been
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satisfied (R. at 382); the only question is whether there exists
an exception to the waiver of immunity under the Act.
A.

Interpreting the term ''arises out of" as
requiring only a showing of but-for causation is
an incorrect reading of the statute and should be
rejected.

As provided in the Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 (5) ,1 immunity
for a negligent act or omission of a governmental employee
committed within the scope of employment is not waived if "the
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from" one
of several listed activities or conditions. The activity under
which the State claims an exception is subsection (5)(e), which
excepts from immunity any injury arising out of "the institution
or prosecution of any judicial . . . proceeding, even if
malicious or without probable cause [.]" The prosecution of a
judicial proceeding relied upon by the State in this case is the
issuance of a search warrant by the Second District Court (R. at
312, 343, 353). The issuance of the warrant led to its execution
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 was recently amended by Laws 2007,
c.357. While there are no substantive differences in the
applicable portions of the law as it currently exists and as it
was at the time of the time the action accrued, the 2004 version
is the version applicable to this case and all citations in this
brief will be to that version. See the Addendum at A-l through
A-3 for the complete 2004 version of the statute.
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and the seizure of the snakes from Appellants. But for the
seizure of the snakes by the State, the State would not have had
them in their possession and so the negligence would not have
taken place. Appellants do not challenge that the issuance of
the search warrant was a part of a judicial proceeding;
Appellants only challenge that their injury "arose out of" the
issuance of the search warrant.2

Appellants have consistently denied that the snakes were
actually used as evidence in a criminal proceeding. Ryan Hoyer
was tried for violations of the Wildlife Code in Clearfield City
v. Ryan Hoyer, case no. 05-8178 in the Clearfield City Justice
Court on October 17, 2006, and a trial de novo on his conviction
was held on May 3, 2007, case no. 071600163 in the Second
District court in and for Davis County. While photographs of the
snakes were introduced, the snakes themselves were never
introduced into evidence at either trial. Appellants did not
challenge the district court's declaration that the snakes were
used as evidence in the order (R. at 382) because it was not a
factor in either his ruling or the State's argument in favor of
summary judgment. The district court's conclusion was plain
error and should not be considered as an undisputed fact in
deciding this appeal. S^e State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 1 11, 10
P.3d 346.
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This Court has previously explained that the phrase "arises
out of" in the Government Immunity Act as meaning "originating
from, growing out of, or flowing from," and requiring "only that
there be some causal relationship between the injury and the
risk." Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 163
(Utah 1996); Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at 5 15 (stating that the
phrase "arise out of" requires only "that there be some causal
nexus between the risk and the resulting injury.") While this
Court has held that "arises out of" means something less than
proximate cause, it has not had occasion to decide or explain
how attenuated the causal relationship must be before an injury
no longer arises out of a cause that triggers an exception to
the waiver of immunity under the Government Immunity Act. 3
The district court's interpretation of "arises out of" as
requiring only a showing of but-for causation is contrary to the
clear purpose of the statute and so should be rejected by this
Court. First, only requiring the State to show but-for causation

3

While Blackner contains language suggesting that this Court

reads "arises out of" as but-for causation, 2002 UT 44 at 11 15,
the issue of how to interpret the phrase was never raised by the
parties on appeal, and arguments as to the proper interpretation
of the phrase "arises out of" have not been heard by this Court
so far as Appellants are aware.
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would make the statutory waiver of immunity meaningless. As was
pointed out by Prosser, a but-for test is no test at all:
At most, [but-for causation] must be a rule of
exclusion . . . . It should be quite obvious that,
once events are set in motion, there is, in terms of
causation alone, no place to stop. The event
without

millions

of causes is simply inconceivable;

and

causation alone can provide no clue of any kind to
singling out those are to be held legally responsible.
William L. Prosser, Law of Torts §41 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis
added). A but-for test sets no limits on the amount of time
elapsed, the physical distance, the number of intervening acts,
or how remote the causal relationship can be between the act
that would give immunity to the State and the injury suffered by
the potential claimant. In fact, using a strict but-for
causation test, all negligent acts of government are immune from
suit. But for enabling legislation (which falls squarely within
the definition of a discretionary function immunized by
subsection (5)(a)) the State would have no power to act.
Likewise, a but-for test would allow the State to claim immunity
under subsection (5)(h) if it showed that the offending
governmental entity was financed by taxes. After all, but for
the collection of the tax, the governmental entity could not
function and the claimant's injury would not have occurred.
While these are arguments are taken to the logical extreme, they
illustrate the absolute necessity of articulating a standard
beyond but-for causation in interpreting the phrase "arises out
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of" in this statute. "To do otherwise would allow the exception
to swallow the rule." Cf^_ Johnson, 2006 UT 15 at 519.
Other appellate court precedents support the idea that more
than but-for causation is required. The definition of "arises
out of" used in Taylor comes from National Farmers Union
Property & Casualty v. Western Casualty & Surety, 577 P.2d 961,
963 (Utah 1978), a liability insurance case. Subsequent
decisions interpreting "arises out of" in the context of
liability insurance have held that the "causal nexus requirement
is more than

x

but-for' causation, but less than legal, proximate

cause." Viking Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 927 P.2d 661 (Utah App.
1996). This comports with an ordinary reading of the term
"arises out of," and the interpretation of "arises out of" in
other contexts. See Estate of Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance,
2004 UT 104 5510-11,

(interpreting "arises out of" in the Utah

Survival Statute and holding that the statute "taken as a whole
and in context" should be interpreted more narrowly than
applying strict "but for" causation); Commercial Carriers v.
Industrial Commission, 888 P.2d 707, 712 (an injury arises out
of employment if the conduct that caused the injury is "closely
entangled" with the employment.).
Another clue showing that Defendant's interpretation is not
what the Legislature intended is found in Utah Code Ann. § 6330d-301 (2) (c) . This subsection provides that immunity is waived
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for "any action based on negligent destruction, damage, or loss
of . . . property while it is in the possession of any
governmental entity or employee, if the property was seized for
the purpose of forfeiture . . . ." The direct implication of
Defendant's interpretation is that governmental entities or
employees could not be liable for any negligent damages to
property seized pursuant to a warrant. That would mean that the
police have a duty of care on property seized for forfeiture,
but no duty of care for property seized as evidence. This is an
inconsistent and absurd result that could not have been intended
by the Legislature.
Finally, the disastrous public policy consequences of
Defendant's interpretation can allow us to safely assume that
the Legislature did not intend for immunity to apply in this
case. As mentioned above, the effect of Defendant's
interpretation would be to declare that the government has no
duty to care for any property that was seized pursuant to a
search warrant. The police would then have no duty to feed
animals seized by search warrant; they could essentially lock an
animal in a closet if they do need the animal to remain alive as
part of presenting their case. While declaring this conduct
legal is appalling enough, it could potentially also allow for
horrendous abuses of police authority. While an extreme example,
one could imagine a scenario in which the police, in seeking to
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punish a suspect who "got off on a technicality/' could easily
destroy property in a way to make it difficult to prove that
their conduct was intentional. It is highly unlikely that the
Legislature would give the police a tool to subvert the
safeguards of criminal procedure.
B.

The proper standard for determining whether an
injury arises out of an excepted activity or
condition is whether the injury is integrally
related to the excepted activity or condition.

To determine what standard should apply to determining
whether an injury arises out of an excepted activity or
condition, and is thus immune from suit, this Court should look
again to the context of insurance contracts. As mentioned
earlier, the definition of "arises out of" used in the context
of the Government Immunity Act comes from cases interpreting the
same phrase in insurance contracts. See Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163
(quoting National Farmers Union, 577 P.2d at 963). The Utah
Court of Appeals has already considered the question of the
proper standard for whether an accident "arises out of" the
ownership, maintenance, or use of a car. Their analysis is a
helpful guide in crafting a standard for the context of the
Government Immunity Act.
While it is universally accepted that an injury arises out
of the use of a car when the injury is sustained while the
insured is driving the car (i.e. the use of the car is the
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direct cause of the accident), courts have ruled that activities
beside operating the vehicle that proximately cause injuries
arise out of the use of a car and so are covered by insurance.
In Viking, the court of appeals determined that causal nexus
required to satisfy "arises out of" was a standard of causation
more than but-for causation but more than proximate causation.
927 P. 2d at 664. The court held that "the causation test does
not require that the insured vehicle itself be the source of the
injury, only that the use be integrally related to the
claimant's activities and the injury at the time of the
accident." Id. At 665 (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
McMichael, 906 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1995). The court also rephrased
the test as whether the act proximately causing the injury was a
''natural and reasonable consequence" of the use of the vehicle.
Viking, 927 P.2d at 664 (quoting Barry v. Illinois Farmers Ins.
Co., 386 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. App. 1986).
Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Gilbert, 124 Idaho 953,
866 P.2d 976 (Idaho App. 1994), one of the cases relied upon by
the Court of Appeals, provides further instruction. In reviewing
cases from sister states, the Idaho court held that an injury
does not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle if there is an
"event[] of independent significance which broke the causal link
between the use of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted."
Gilbert, 124 Idaho at 959. This is another way of phrasing the
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test in Viking — whether the intervening events between the use
of the vehicle and the injury were integrally related to the use
of the vehicle. 927 P.2d at 665. An event has independent
significance in the insurance context if it is unrelated to the
use of the vehicle for transportation purposes. Gilbert, 124
Idaho at 959. Thus, injuries caused by a battery did not arise
out of the use of an automobile, even though the events that
provoked the battery were committed during the use of an
automobile. United Services Automobile Association v. Ledger,
234 Cal. Rptr 570 (1987); Kangas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
235 N.W.2d 42 (Mich. App. 1975). However, slipping on ice while
entering an automobile, Barry v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.,
386 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. App. 1986), and being struck by a car
while in the process of repairing one's own car, Viking, 927
P. 2d 661, are not events of independent significance and so the
injury would arise out of the use of a vehicle.
This formula can be easily applied to the government
immunity context. The test for whether a negligent act is
excepted from liability under the Government Immunity Act is a
two-part test: first, if the excepted activity or condition is a
direct cause4 of the injury, there is immunity from suit under

Here, direct cause refers to the proximate cause of the injury,
even if the cause was a foreseeable intervening cause that would
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the Act. Second, if the excepted activity is not the direct
cause of the injury, then a court should determine whether the
negligent act or omission that a plaintiff claims proximately
caused its injuries was integrally related to the excepted
activity or condition such that the act or omission was a
natural or reasonable consequence of the excepted activity or
condition, or whether the act or omission constituted an event
of independent significance that would break the causal link
between the excepted activity or condition and the injury.
The government immunity cases already decided by the Utah
appellate courts easily fit within this framework. For example,
When a student is injured when he was pushed through a glass
window by another student on school property, the injury was
directly caused by a battery and therefore, the State is immune
from prosecution. See Taylor, 927 P.2d 159. When a person
injured by an avalanche caused by the negligent acts of State
employees in managing a previous avalanche, the State is immune
from liability because (a) the avalanche was a natural condition
on the land and the direct cause of the injury, and (b) the
negligent act in managing the first avalanche was integrally
related to the first avalanche. Blackner, 2002 UT 44.

not cut off liability in a suit for negligence against a private
individual.
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The judicial proceeding exception listed in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30d-301 (5) (e) would immunize the State from acts in which
the judicial proceeding was the direct cause of the injury, such
as imprisonment, civil fines, or the costs of defending against
a frivolous lawsuit, as well as immunizing the State for
negligent acts that occurred after the judicial proceeding but
were integrally related to the judicial proceeding, such as
negligently arresting the wrong person incident to an arrest
warrant. However, the Legislature did not intend to give State
employees immunity from suit for all negligent acts that are
connected, however remotely, to a judicial proceeding.
C.

The negligent acts of State employees in this
case were not integrally related to the judicial
proceeding and therefore are not immune from
suit.

Applying the test explained above to the present case, the
negligent acts of State employees are too remote to the judicial
proceeding to be integrally related to that proceeding. First,
the issuance of the warrant was not the direct cause of
Appellants' injuries. The negligent acts of State employees
occurred well after the issuance of the warrant. The question
then becomes whether the State's activities after the issuance
of the search warrant were integrally related to the issuance of
the search warrant.
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The failure of the State to take reasonable care of the
snakes while in their custody is not integrally related to the
issuance of the warrant and therefore there is no immunity.
State employees had observed the snakes dying, they were offered
help and advice in caring for the snakes from either Appellant
Richard Hoyer or a third party, and they refused. When a party's
negligence is pointed out to her and she persists in her
negligence, that act constitutes an event of independent
significance that breaks the chain of causation because it
constitutes gross negligence. After being put on notice of their
failure to properly care for the snakes, any further acts of
negligence are willful and reckless and would constitute gross
negligence. Because of the willful nature of these grossly
negligent acts, they should be deemed to break the chain of
causation per

se.

In this way, it would be clear that the State

has a minimal standard of care for property in its custody.
Secondly, activities related to the custody of items seized
are not integrally related to the issuance of a search warrant.
As pointed out before, the Government Immunity Act imposes an
ordinary standard of care for the State's handling of property
seized for forfeiture purposes under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d~301
(2)(c). There is no rational basis for distinguishing property
held for forfeiture purposes and property held for evidentiary
purposes. Therefore, the law should be read to impose an equal
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duty of care for property held for forfeiture purposes and
evidentiary purposes.
Finally, the negligent acts of State employees in caring
for the snakes were too remote in time and place from the
issuance in the search warrant to be considered integrally
related. While the Act may grant immunity, that immunity cannot
last beyond a reasonable timeframe in which the direct
consequences of the judicial proceeding would occur. To hold
otherwise would give the State no duty to care for a person's
property in its custody, no matter how long the State holds that
property. As mentioned earlier, this conclusion would allow for
police misconduct with no civil recourse. That is something that
the Legislature did not intend, and this Court should construe
the law in a way to discourage police misconduct.
CONCLUSION
The Government Immunity Act should not be read to give the
police no duty to care for property seized as evidence. The
Legislature intended for the Act to give private citizens a
safeguard for their property beyond the good graces of the
State. This Court should reverse the decision of the district
court and remand for further proceedings.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of June, 2008.

Narhan whirtaker
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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ADDENDUM

63-30d-301.
Waivers of immunity — Exceptions.
(As amended by Laws 2004, c.267, §13)
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
waived as to any contractual obligation.
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or
obligations are not subject to the requirements of Sections 6330d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, or 63-30d-601.
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for
failure to deliver water from a reservoir or associated facility
authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act,
if the failure to deliver the contractual amount of water is due
to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition that
causes a deficiency in the amount of available water.
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
waived:
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession
of, or quiet title to real or personal property;
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or
other liens on real or personal property, to determine any
adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an
adjudication about any mortgage or other lien that the
governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal
property;
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction,
damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property while
it is in the possession of any governmental entity or employee,
if the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under
any provision of state law;
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(1), as to any action
brought under the authority of Article I, Section 22, of the
Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the
governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or
damaged private property for public uses without just
compensation;
(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any action
brought to recover attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and
63-2-802;
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah
Protection of Public Employees Act.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity
from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury
caused by:
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public
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building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public
improvement.
(b) Immunity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public
improvement.
(4) Immunity is waived as to any injury proximately caused
by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within
the scope of
employment.
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not
waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out
of, in connection with, or results from:
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise
or perform, a discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abused;
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process,
libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights,
infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights;
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke,
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection;
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable
cause;
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is
negligent or intentional;
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob
violence, and civil disturbances;
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled
lands, any condition existing in connection with an abandoned
mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands;
(1) research or implementation of cloud management or
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seeding for the clearing of fog;
(m) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural
disasters;
(n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or
storm systems;
(o) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6a-208;
(p) the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous
materials or hazardous wastes;
(iv) emergency evacuations;
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place
where emergency medical assistance can be rendered or where the
person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies;
(q) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise
or perform, any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Board
of Water Resources - Division of Water Resources; or
(r) unauthorized access to government records, data, or
electronic information systems by any person or entity.
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MATTHEW D BATES (9861)
BARRY G LAWRENCE (5304)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARKL SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys foi Defendants
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P O Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone (801)366-0100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RYAN HOYER, RICHARDS F HOYER,
ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
V

Civil No 040916063

STATE OF UTAH, JIM KARPOWITZ,
RICHARD ASHCROFT, RUDY
MUSCLOW, MILES MORETTI (in their
official capacity as officials fo the Utah
DWR),

Judge Anthony B Quinn

Defendants.

Procedural Background: This case arises out of the State of Utah's (the "State" or
"defendant") seizure of plaintiffs' snakes pursuant to a search warrant executed upon plaintiff
Ryan Hoyer Plaintiffs assert that the State was negligent m carmg foi the snakes and assert
damages for the value of the snakes

A-4

On Septembc] 11, 2007, the State filed its Motion for Summary Judgment cus to Plaintiffs'
Negligence Claim, along with a supporting memorandum, in which the Stale asserted that
plaintiffs' negligence claim against the State was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 (5)(e)
of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30(1-101, et. seq. (the
"Immunity Act")), because their alleged damages arose out of "the institution or prosecution of
[a] judicial proceeding." Plaintiffs filed a responsive memorandum on September 18, 2007. The
State filed a reply memorandum on October 1, 2007.
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment The matter was submitted for decision,
and a hearing took place on the State's Motion on November 20, 2007, at 8:30 a.m. Barry G.
Lawrence and Matthew D. Bates, Assistant Attorneys General, appeared on behalf of the State;
Stephen Spencer appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. At the conclusion of oral argument, and
having considered the pleadings and submissions of the parties, and the argument of counsel, the
Court granted the State's Motion.
The Court specifically Rules as follows:
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment, the following facts are
undisputed:
1.

Plaintiffs' snakes were seized by the State pursuant to a search warrant that was

issued by Judge Glenn Dawson of the Second District Court.
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2.

The Snakes were used as evidence in criminal proceedings against plaintiff Ryan

I-Joyer in both Davis County Justice Court and Clearfield City Justice Court.
3.

All of plaintiffs' claimed damages result from the seizure of the Snakes; but for

the seizure of the Snakes, plaintiffs would not have suffered any damages.
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment, this Court makes the
following conclusions of law:
1. The State's actions in seizing plaintiffs' snakes and prosecuting plaintiff Ryan Hoyer
were governmental functions for which the State is immune absent a waiver of immunity. This is
not disputed by plaintiffs.
2. For purposes of this Motion, the State has admitted a waiver of immunity herein.
3. An exception to that waiver of immunity exists in this case, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e)? because plaintiffs' injuries all arose out of the institution or prosecution
of judicial proceedings. The term "arises out o f has been construed broadly by the Utah
Supreme Court and only requires that there be some causal nexus between the judicial
proceeding and plaintiffs' injuries. But for the actions taken by the State pursuant to a judicial
proceeding, plaintiffs would not have suffered injury. Accordingly, an exception to the waiver
of immunity exists in this case.
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4. Therefore, the Slate is immune from all of plaintiffs' claims of negligence in tins
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e) ofthc Governmenta] Immunity Act of
Utah.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The State's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim is
granted.
2. Accordingly, all of plaintiffs' negligence claims against the State are hereby
dismissed, on their merits and with prejudice.
3. As this Order resolves all claims pending between the plaintiffs and the State of Utah,
the Court hereby dismisses the State as a defendant in this matter, with prejudice.
DATED this

day of November, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE ANTHONY B. QUINN
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify thai on the^A_ day of November, 2007, pursuant to Rule 7(1), Utah R.
Civ P., I caused to be served by fax transmission, a true and correct copy of foregoing
(Proposed) ORDER GRATING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, to the following:
Stephen D. Spencer
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, LC
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
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